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Abstract
Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents’ competitions in Finance,
for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk,
and insurance markets. The recently proposed machine learning algorithm, deep fictitious play, provides
a novel efficient tool for finding Markovian Nash equilibrium of large N -player asymmetric stochastic
differential games [J. Han and R. Hu, Mathematical and Scientific Machine Learning Conference, 2020].
By incorporating the idea of fictitious play, the algorithm decouples the game into N sub-optimization
problems, and identifies each player’s optimal strategy with the deep backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE) method parallelly and repeatedly. In this paper, under appropriate conditions, we
prove the convergence of deep fictitious play (DFP) to the true Nash equilibrium. We can also show that
the strategy based on DFP forms an -Nash equilibrium. We generalize the algorithm by proposing a
new approach to decouple the games, and present numerical results of large population games showing
the empirical convergence of the algorithm beyond the technical assumptions in the theorems.
Keywords: Deep fictitious play, convergence analysis, stochastic differential games, Markovian Nash
equilibrium, backward stochastic differential equations.
1 Introduction
Deep neural network has become a popular and powerful tool in scientific computing, for its remarkable
performance in approximating high-dimensional functions. Its success has brought natural applications in
stochastic differential games, where high-dimensional optimization problems and/or stochastic differential
equations are solved to provide the modeling and analysis of tactical interactions among multiple decision-
makers in the context of a random dynamical system. These decision-makers, usually referred to as players
or agents, can interact in a manner ranging from completely non-cooperative to completely cooperative.
The nature of uncertainty makes stochastic differential games appropriate to be used for the study of
competitions in Finance, e.g., in P2P lending platforms [61, 43] from the Fintech industry and insurance
markets [63, 5, 15].
For non-cooperative stochastic differential games, a core problem is to compute the associated Nash
equilibrium, which refers to a set of strategies so that when applied, no player will profit from unilaterally
changing her own choice. When the games involve heterogeneous agents of moderate size, e.g., 5 ≤ N ≤ 100,
computing the Nash equilibrium becomes numerically challenging since conventional numerical algorithms
lose their efficiency for N beyond 5, and the mean-field framework has not started to work well with
N ≤ 100 asymmetric players.
To address the challenge, the authors have recently proposed the deep fictitious play (DFP) algorithms
[27], providing a novel efficient tool for finding Markovian Nash equilibrium of large N -player asymmetric
stochastic differential games. However, despite the efficient performance in simulation, the algorithm’s
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theoretical foundation is still lacking, which will be the focus of this paper. In addition, we generalize the
previous algorithms, and propose a general two-step scheme: The first step aims to recast the game into
N sub-problems that will be repeatedly solved. The desired algorithm requires that, after the recast, the
sub-problems are decoupled among different players given the previous stage’s solutions, and that their
solutions converge to the true Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we propose two options for the first step:
I. Fictitious play. This approach was used in [27], assuming that players are myopic and will choose
their best responses against others’ previous stage action at every subsequent stage. Therefore each
player still faces a nonlinear optimization problem.
II. Policy update. This approach calculates the game values using all responses from the previous stage,
and the current stage responses are determined as if they are the optimizers of the calculated game
values.
The second step of the DFP algorithm aims to solve the sub-problems efficiently and accurately. Remark
that, due to the large number of players and the high dimensionality of the controlled state process, each
sub-problem may still be high-dimensional after the decoupling step. In [27], the Deep BSDE method was
employed for each sub-problem, which presents excellent performance. It relies on the BSDE representations
of semi-linear partial differential equations (PDEs) and deep learning approximations after discretizing the
BSDE by an Euler scheme. It parametrizes the initial position of the backward process and the adjoint
process by DNNs, then simulates both processes in a forward manner, aiming to minimize the discrepancy
between the terminal value of the backward process and its network approximation. The analysis for the
second step shall focus on this method. Meanwhile, we remark that other deep neural networks (DNNs)
based algorithms, such as deep learning backward dynamic programming (DBDP) method [36] and deep
Galerkin method [60], are also promising choices for solving sub-problems.
Related literature. The theoretical study of differential games was initiated by R. Isaacs in the early
1960s [38]. Later on, to better describe read world’s uncertainties, noises are added to the state of the sys-
tem, and stochastic differential games now have been intensively used across many disciplines. Domains of
applications include management science (e.g., operations management, marketing, finance, systemic risk),
economics (e.g., industrial organization, environmental and macroeconomics, production of exhaustible
resources), social science (e.g., networks, crowd behavior, congestion), biology (e.g., flocking), and military
(e.g., cyber-attacks).
Fictitious play is well documented in the economics literature, as a learning process for finding Nash
equilibria. It was firstly proposed by [9, 10] for normal-form games. Since then, there have been extensive
studies on the convergence of fictitious play or its variation under different setting, for instance, see [47,
49, 42, 32, 6]. For stochastic differential games, besides [27], the most related work is [34], where fictitious
play is used to design numerical algorithms for finding open-loop Nash equilibria. We remark that, the
idea of fictitious play is not limited to study the games with a moderate number of heterogeneous players
[34, 27], but has also been applied in mean-field games, e.g., some later works [11, 8, 19] in the community
of financial mathematics.
The proposed policy update for the first step of the DFP algorithm closely follows policy iteration
(PI) in spirit, which was initially introduced by Howard [33] for discounted Markovian decision problems
(MDP). It consists of two steps: policy evaluation (obtaining the expected reward for a given policy) and
policy improvement (updating the policy using the rewards for successor states). PI was later generalized
to modified PI in [59], and has remained as the method of choice in designing reinforcement learning
algorithms, e.g., see [24, 57] and the references therein.
The literature of using DNNs for learning high-dimensional function is rich, including methods for
solving high-dimensional parabolic PDEs and BSDEs (e.g., the deep BSDE method [17, 28], the DBDP
[36, 21], and many others [60, 3, 4, 56, 62, 39]). It also yields algorithms for solving the Schro¨dinger
equation [31, 55, 30], stochastic control problems [26, 50], mean field games [14, 1] and nonlinear optimal
stopping problems [35].
Main contribution. The contribution of this paper consists of the following: 1. We propose a general
two-step scheme that extends the original deep fictitious play algorithm [27], and provide two options
for solving the first step. The proposed algorithm can efficiently solve stochastic differential games with
2
heterogeneous agents of large size (e.g., 5 ≤ N ≤ 100), and the presence of common noise. 2. We provide
the theoretical foundation for the proposed algorithms. In specific, with small time duration, we prove
that the solutions to the decoupled sub-problems, if solved repeatedly and exactly at each stage, converge
to the true Nash equilibrium; that the numerical solutions to each sub-problem tend to be exact as we
refine the time step in the Euler scheme; and that the strategy based on numerical solutions forms an
-Nash equilibrium, after running sufficiently many stages and using sufficiently fine time step. 3. We
present numerical results showing empirical convergence even beyond the technical assumptions used in
the theorems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the mathematical formulation
of general N -player asymmetric stochastic games in continuous time. The algorithms consisting of the
decoupling step and sub-problem-solving step via deep learning are detailed in Section 3. Section 4 provides
convergence analysis for the proposed algorithms, followed by numerical examples presented in Section 5.
We make conclusive remarks in Section 6.
2 Mathematical Formulation
Throughout the paper, we shall use the following notations:
• A boldface character refers to a collection of objects from all players;
• A regular character with a superscript i refers to an objective from player i (no matter a scalar or a
vector) or the ith column of a vector;
• A boldface character with a superscript −i refers to a collection of objects from all players except i;
• The state process Xt introduced below is a common process to all players, and will always be in
boldface.
We consider a general N -player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games. An Rn-valued common
state process Xt is controlled by a Markovian strategy/policy
1 α:
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t ,α(t,X
α
t )) dt+ Σ(t,X
α
t ) dWt, X0 = x0, (1)
where α = (α1, . . . , αN ) is the collection of all players’ Ai-valued strategies. For simplicity, we assume
Ai = Rdα for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . If not (e.g., some boundedness constraints are put on αi), we can assume
there exist Lipschitz mappings P iα from Rdα to Ai so that Ai = P iα(Rdα), and all the statements below
hold easily with the help of the Lipschitz mappings. The drift and diffusion coefficients b and Σ are
deterministic functions of the common state, b : [0, T ] × Rn × A ↪→ Rn, Σ: [0, T ] × Rn ↪→ Rn×k, where
A = ⊗Ni=1Ai = RNdα is the space for the joint control α, and W is a k-dimensional standard Brownian
motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P).
Player i aims at minimizing her expected total cost:
inf
αi∈Ai
E
[∫ T
0
f i(s,Xαs ,α(s,X
α
s )) ds+ g
i(XαT )
]
(2)
by choosing αi among all admissible strategies Ai:
Ai =
{
αi(t,x) : Borel measurable function [0, T ]× Rn ↪→ Rdα} ,
where the running cost f i : [0, T ] × Rn × A ↪→ R and the terminal cost gi : Rn ↪→ R are deterministic
measurable functions. Obviously, the quantity in (2) is also affected by other players’ strategies αj . To
emphasis this dependence, we introduce the notation J it (α
1, . . . , αN ) for the cost of player i starting at t
when players choose their strategies (α1, . . . , αN ):
J it (α
1, . . . , αN ) ≡ J it (α) := E
[∫ T
t
f i(s,Xαs ,α(s,X
α
s )) ds+ g
i(XαT )
]
. (3)
1Hereafter, we shall use strategy and policy interchangeably.
3
In the following sections, we shall present the algorithms for solving the above game and prove its
theoretical convergence. In particular, we are interested in finding the Markovian Nash equilibrium (or the
Markovian -Nash equilibrium).
Definition 2.1. A Markovian -Nash equilibrium is a tuple α = (α1,, . . . , αN,) ∈ A, such that, for
non-negative ,
∀i ∈ I, and αi ∈ Ai, J i0(α)−  ≤ J i0(α1,, . . . , αi−1,, αi, αi+1,, . . . , αN,).
A Markovian Nash equilibrium, denoted by α∗, is equivalent to an -Nash equilibrium where  = 0. Here
A = ⊗Ni=1Ai is the product space of Ai, and I = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of all players.
As discussed in [27], the formulation (1)–(2) is less restrictive than the usual case where player i
can only control her private state. Here, a common state Xt is controlled by all agents, which is a
common feature in economics literature (see e.g., [16, 58, 44]). Therefore, it is important to include it
in our framework, although this will increase the coupling and make the problem harder to solve, both
theoretically and numerically. Remark that the difficulty still persists in the limiting problem as N → ∞
with indistinguishable players, when allowing αi entering into others’ states. This is called the extended
mean-field game and it has attracted certain attention recently (e.g., [22, 23, 12]). On the other hand, by
choosing b and Σ in (1) properly, one can reduce the formulation (1) to the simpler case where each player
controls her private state through αi. For instance, if each player’s private state is d-dimensional, we can
let n = dN , b = (b1, . . . , b`, . . . , bn) with b` ≡ b`(t,x, αi) for ` = (i − 1)d + 1, . . . , id, then the problem
(1)–(2) is the standard modeling in financial mathematics literature, with the ith player’s d-dimensional
private state (X
(i−1)d+1
t , . . . , X
id
t ) controlled by α
i only.
In the Markovian setting, the value function of player i reads as:
V i(t,x) = inf
αi∈Ai
E
[∫ T
t
f i(s,Xαs ,α(s,X
α
s )) ds+ g
i(XαT )
∣∣∣Xαt = x
]
.
Then, to compute the Markovian Nash equilibrium, we apply the dynamic programming principle and
obtain a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations:V
i
t + inf
αi∈Ai
{
b(t,x,α) · ∇xV i + f i(t,x,α)
}
+
1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV
iΣ) = 0,
V i(T,x) = gi(x), i ∈ I,
(4)
where V it , ∇xV i, HessxV i denote the derivative of V i with respect to t, the gradient and the Hessian of
function V i with respect to x, and Tr denotes the trace of a matrix. Note that the HJB system (4) is
coupled, as each minimizer αi,∗ depends on V i and the function b and f i in (4) depend on all minimizers
α∗ = (α1,∗, . . . , αN,∗).
Under appropriate conditions, the solution to (4) is related to BSDEs, using nonlinear Feynman-Kac
formula (cf. [52, 18, 53]). To ease our notations of the BSDEs, we prescribe the following the relation on
b and Σ.
Assumption 1. There exists a measurable function φ: [0, T ]× Rn ×A → Rk, so that Σ(t,x)φ(t,x,α) =
b(t,x,α) for any (t,x,α) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×A.
Consequently, we can define the Hamiltonian function H(t,x,α,p) : [0, T ]×Rn×A×Rk×N → RN by:
H = [H1, . . . ,HN ]T, Hi(t,x,α, pi) = φ(t,x,α) · pi + f i(t,x,α), (5)
where pi denotes the ith column of p, and thus is an Rk vector. Using this notation, the HJB system can
be rewritten as:
V it + inf
αi∈Ai
Hi(t,x,α,ΣT∇xV i) + 1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV
iΣ) = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
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To better describe the optimal game policies, we define a(t,x,α,p) : [0, T ]× Rn ×A× Rk×N → A by:
a = (a1, . . . , aN ), ai(t,x,α−i, pi) = arg min
αi∈Ai
Hi(t,x, (αi,α−i), pi), ∀i ∈ I. (6)
In other words, ai is the minimizer of the ith Hamiltonian, with an emphasis of the dependence on the ith
player’s game value ΣT∇xV i and others’ strategies α−i. Then, we define a function α(t,x,p) as the fixed
point of
α = a(t,x,α,p). (7)
Note that, with the above notations a and α, we have assumed the minimizer in (6) exists and is unique,
and (7) has a unique fixed point. Later in Assumption 2, we will detail explicit conditions on the model
parameters, such that these assumptions are satisfied.
We now state the corresponding BSDE formulation of (4), which is the key component of the algorithm
design in Section 3 and the convergence analysis in Section 4. Let (Xt,Yt,Zt) ∈ Rn ×RN ×Rk×N be the
solution to the following BSDE:
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Yt = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Hˇ(s,Xs,Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
ZTs dWs,
(8)
where Hˇ(t,x,p) := H(t,x,α(t,x,p),p) is the minimized Hamiltonian vector, and g(x) ≡ [g1, . . . , gN ]T(x)
is the vector form of all terminal costs. Then we have the relation:
Yt = [Y
1
t , . . . , Y
N
t ]
T, Y it = V
i(t,Xt),
Zt = [Z
1
t , . . . , Z
N
t ], Z
i
t = Σ
T(t,Xt)∇xV i(t,Xt), (9)
and the optimal game policy is expressed by
α∗t = α(t,Xt,Zt).
Using the relation (9), we notice α∗t = α(t,Xt,Σ
T(t,Xt)∇xV (t,Xt))2, and sometimes write α∗t =
α∗(t,Xt).
If solving directly, no matter which system ((4) or (8)), one will encounter computational difficulties
due to the high dimensionality of Xt or the large number of agents. To overcome this, we propose a
two-step scheme in Section 3, where we generalize the idea in [27] and offer two options for the first step.
The convergence analysis with appropriate assumptions will be presented in Section 4.
3 Algorithm
The two-step scheme for solving Markovian Nash equilibrium works as follows. We first decouple the
problem (1)–(2) into N independent sub-problems, for which we need to solve repeatedly and can solve
in a parallel manner. Since each sub-problem may still be high-dimensional, we then solve them using
deep neural networks with a reformulation in backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). Next,
we describe the algorithms for each step in detail.
3.1 Step I: Decoupling
This step aims to decentralize the game, converting it into single-agent problems to be solved repeatedly.
The algorithms start with an initial guess of the Nash equilibrium α0 = [α1,0, . . . , αN,0] and produce a
sequence of strategies afterward, which we denote by α1, . . .αm, . . .. The following two options at this step
differ in how the sequence is determined. Notationwise, αm refers to the collection of all players’ policies
at stage m, and its ith component αi,m refers to player i’s choice.
2We use ∇xV as an n×N matrix.
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1. Fictitious Play. In this option of Step I, at each stage, each player faces an optimization problem
(2) while assuming that others are using their strategies from the previous stage as fixed strategies.
In other words, at stage m+ 1, αm is known to all players, and player i’s decision problem is
inf
αi∈Ai
J i0(α
i;α−i,m), (10)
where J i0 is defined in (3), and the state process Xt follows (1) with α being replaced by (α
i;α−i,m).
Here α−i,m represents the strategies of all players but player i at stage m, and (αi;α−i,m) is a short
notation of (α1,m, . . . , αi−1,m, αi, αi+1,m, αN,m), which emphasis the parameter role of α−i,m.
Under the Markovian framework, we denote by V i,m+1 the problem value of player i at stage m.
Following the idea of fictitious play, it is the solution of the following HJB systemV
i,m+1
t + inf
αi∈Ai
Hi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m)(t,x),ΣT∇xV i,m+1) + 1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV
i,m+1Σ) = 0,
V i,m+1(T,x) = gi(x).
(11)
2. Policy Update. This is slightly different from fictitious play, where every player follows her strategy
from the previous stage to update the problem value. In this case, it is no longer an optimization,
but a linear problem for the value function induced by the fix strategy αm:V
i,m+1
t +H
i(t,x,αm(t,x),ΣT∇xV i,m+1) + 1
2
Tr(ΣTHessxV
i,m+1Σ) = 0,
V i,m+1(T,x) = gi(x).
(12)
After solving out the decoupled PDE (11) or (12), at the end of stage m + 1, a policy αi,m+1 is
determined by
αi,m+1(t,x) = arg min
αi∈Ai
Hi(t,x, (αi,α−i,m)(t,x),ΣT∇xV i,m+1(t,x)), (13)
and policies from all players together form αm+1.
Note that for fictitious play algorithm, αi,m+1 is indeed the optimal strategy of problem (10); while for
policy update algorithm, the problem is linear, but we pretend that V i,m+1 is the value of an optimization
problem, and αi,m+1 is determined as if it is an optimizer.
3.2 Step II: Solving Each Sub-problem via BSDE
For each sub-problem, described by (11) or (12), we write down their BSDE counterpart:
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Y i,m+1t = g
i(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Hˆi(s,Xs,α
−i,m(s,Xs), Zi,m+1s ) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zi,m+1s )
T dWs,
(14)
where Hˆi is defined by
Hˆi(t,x,α−i, pi) = Hi(t,x, (ai(t,x,α−i, pi),α−i), pi), (15)
or 
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Y i,m+1t = g
i(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Hi(s,Xs,α
m(s,Xs), Z
i,m+1
s ) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zi,m+1s )
T dWs.
(16)
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Here x0 is a random variable whose range covers the states of interest. Note that, in the both BSDEs
above, we choose the forward process without a drift term to avoid the involvement of αm, and thus keep
the forward process the same from stage to stage, which facilitates our analysis. For both sub-problems,
the connection between the associated BSDEs and PDEs are the same:
Y i,m+1t = V
i,m+1(t,Xt), Z
i,m+1
t = Σ(t,Xt)
T∇xV i,m+1(t,Xt),
and according to (13), both optimal policy processes at stage m+ 1 are expressed by
αi,m+1t = a
i(t,Xt,α
−i,m
t , Z
i,m+1
t ).
Therefore, it suffices to solve these two possibly high-dimensional BSDE systems by an efficient algo-
rithm, which we shall describe and call deep BSDE in the sequel. To avoid notation cumbersomeness and
repetition, the algorithms will be presented on a generic BSDE with possibly non-zero drift term:
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
µ(s,Xs) ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Yt = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
F (s,Xs, Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
ZTs dWs.
(17)
The algorithm applied to the exact system (14) and (16) will be presented in Section 4.2.
The deep BSDE is firstly introduced in [17], for solving high-dimensional parabolic PDEs. The idea is
to solve a single variational form of (17) after a temporal discretization version using deep neural networks.
For a partition pi of size NT on the time interval [0, T ], 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tNT = T , ∆tk and ∆Wk are
short notations for the time and Brownian motion increments respectively, and we denote by ‖pi‖ the mesh
of this partition:
∆tk = tk+1 − tk, ∆Wk = Wtk+1 −Wtk , ‖pi‖ = max
0≤k≤NT−1
∆tk. (18)
We also define a step function pi(t), and a set T for later use:
pi(t) = tk for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), T := {t0, t1, . . . , tNT−1}. (19)
The deep BSDE method solves the minimization problem:
inf
ψ0∈N ′0 , {φk∈Nk}
NT−1
k=0
E|g(XpiT )− Y piT |2, (20)
s.t. Xpi0 = x0, Y
pi
0 = ψ0(X
pi
0 ), Z
pi
tk
= φk(X
pi
tk
), k = 0, . . . , NT − 1
Xpitk+1 = X
pi
tk
+ µ(tk, X
pi
tk
)∆tk + Σ(tk, X
pi
tk
)∆Wk, (21)
Y pitk+1 = Y
pi
tk
− F (tk, Xpitk , Zpitk)∆tk + (Zpitk)T∆Wk, (22)
where N ′0 and {Nk}NT−1k=0 are hypothesis spaces related to deep neural networks, and for brevity, we use the
notation Xpi0 for X
pi
t0 , X
pi
T for X
pi
tNT
, etc. The goal is to find optimal deterministic maps ψ∗0 , {φ∗k}NT−1k=0 such
that the loss function in (20) is minimized. Intuitively, the smaller of (20) provides the better approximation
to the original problem (17). In practice, the expected value is replaced by the loss of a very deep neural
network, which is formed by stacking all the subnetworks ψ0, {φk}NT−1k=0 in sequence according to (22). The
loss is computed by generating sample paths of {Wtk}NTk=0 and producing (21)–(22). At each stage, there
are N losses corresponding to N sub-problems solved by the deep BSDE method.
Here we recall a convergence theorem for the deep BSDE method from [29].
Theorem 1. For the generic BSDE (17), we assume:
1. The functions µ, Σ, g and F satisfy the following Lipschitz condition:
|µ(t, x1)− µ(t, x2)|2 + ‖Σ(t, x1)− Σ(t, x2)‖2F + |F (t, x1, p1)− F (t, x2, p2)|2
+ |g(x1)− g(x2)|2 ≤ L
[|x1 − x2|2 + |p1 − p2|2] ,
for a constant L > 0;
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2. The functions µ, Σ and h are all 1/2-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to t. For simplicity, We also
use L for this Ho¨lder constant.
3. The constant L also denotes the upper bound of |µ(0, 0)|2, ‖Σ(0, 0)‖2F , |F (0, 0, 0)|2 and |g(0)|2.
Then, we have the following two estimates:
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Yt − Y pipi(t)|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zt − Zpipi(t)‖2F dt ≤ C
[‖pi‖+ E|g(XpiT )− Y piT |2] (23)
inf
ψ0∈N ′0 , {φk∈Nk}
NT−1
k=0
E|g(XpiT )− Y piT |2 ≤ C
[
‖pi‖+
inf
ψ0∈N ′0 , {φk∈Nk}
NT−1
k=0
{
E|Y0 − ψ0(x0)|2 +
NT−1∑
k=0
E‖Zˆtk − φk(Xpitk)‖2F∆tk
}]
, (24)
where ‖pi‖ and pi(t) are given in (18)–(19), Zˆtk = (∆tk)−1E[
∫ tk+1
tk
Zt dt|Xpitk ], and C > 0 is a constant only
depending on L and T .
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is a brief summary of Theorems 1 and 2 in [29]. The first inequality (23) shows
that the distance between the true solution of BSDE (17) and the output of the deep BSDE method can
be controlled by its loss function. In other words, in practice, the accuracy of the numerical solution is
effectively indicated by the value of loss function. The second inequality (24) states that a small loss function
of the deep BSDE method is attainable if the hypothesis spaces (N ′0 and {Nk}NT−1k=0 ) can approximate
specific functions well. Beyond Theorems 1 and 2 in [29], there are still some theoretical issues remaining
unresolved regarding the deep BSDE method, which are common in almost all the algorithms involving deep
neural networks: First, it is unclear yet that what types of hypothesis spaces can approximate the specific
functions in the deep BSDE method without the curse of dimensionality (i.e., the number of parameters
of neural networks grows at most polynomially both in dimension and the reciprocal of the approximation
error). Second, even with suitable function spaces, it is hard to guarantee the optimization algorithm can
find approximately the minimizer of the highly nonconvex loss function. We refer the interested readers to
[17, 28, 29] for more detailed descriptions and theoretical justifications of the deep BSDE method. Details
on the implementation in this paper are presented in Section 5.
4 Convergence Analysis
This section will provide the theoretical foundation for the deep fictitious play algorithm. Section 4.1
focuses on the decoupling step. Theorem 2 proves the convergence to the true Nash equilibrium, if the
decoupled sub-problems are solved exactly and repeatedly. Section 4.2 focuses on the numerical error on
the deep BSDE algorithm for solving each sub-problem. Theorem 3 presents a game version of Theorem 1.
Section 4.3 combines the previous results, identifies the -Nash equilibrium produced by deep fictitious
play, and analyzes its numerical performance on the original game.
4.1 Convergence Analysis of the Decoupling Step
In this section, we will focus on the convergence of the decoupling step, i.e., how the systems defined
by PDEs (11) (fictitious play) or (12) (policy update) converge to the system defined by PDEs (4), or
equivalently, how the corresponding BSDE systems (14) (fictitious play) or (16) (policy update) converge
to the BSDE system (8).
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. We shall use | · | and ‖ · ‖F to denote the L2-norm and Frobenius norm, respectively.
(1) The functions φ(t,x,α) : [0, T ] × Rn × A → Rk, Σ(t,x) : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn×k, f(t,x,α) =
(f1, f2, . . . , fN )T(t,x,α) : [0, T ] × Rn × A → RN and g(x) = [g1, g2, . . . , gN ]T(x) : Rn → RN are
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Lipschitz with respect to x and α:
|φ(t,x1,α1)− φ(t,x2,α2)|2 ≤ φx|x1 − x2|2 + φα|α1 −α2|2,
‖Σ(t,x1)− Σ(t,x2)‖2F ≤ Σx|x1 − x2|2,
|f(t,x1,α1)− f(t,x2,α2)|2 ≤ fx|x1 − x2|2 + fα|α1 −α2|2,
|g(x1)− g(x2)|2 ≤ gx|x1 − x2|2.
Here φx, φα,Σx, fx, fα, gx are all positive constants, and the same below.
(2) The function a(t,x,α,p) given in (6) is well-defined, and is Lipschitz with respect to x, α and p:
|a(t,x1,α1,p1)− a(t,x2,α2,p2)|2 ≤ ax|x1 − x2|2 + aα|α1 −α2|2 + ap‖p1 − p2‖2F ,
with aα < 1. Notice that this also implies that α(t,x,p) defined by (7) exists and is unique, which is
Lipschitz with respect to x and p:
|α(t,x1,p1)−α(t,x2,p2)|2 ≤ αx|x1 − x2|2 + αp‖p1 − p2‖2F .
Here αx = ax/(1− aα) and αp = ap/(1− aα).
(3) The functions φ and Σ are uniformly bound:
‖Σ(t,x)‖2F ≤MΣ,
|φ(t,x,α)| ≤Mφ.
(4) The functions φ, Σ, f , g and a are all 1/2-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to t. We shall use K as
the upper bound of all the Ho¨lder constants.
(5) The constant K is also the upper bound of constants |a(0, 0, 0, 0)|2, |f(0, 0, 0)|2 and |g(0)|2.
The first result in this section gives a uniform bound of the Z-component of the BSDEs, which is
classical in the literature (cf. [66, Theorem 5.2.2]). We state and provide the proof of this lemma here to
compute an exact upper bound for the convenience of later analysis.
Lemma 1. Let (Xt,Yt,Zt), the adapted process taking value in Rn × RN × Rk×N , be the solution of the
following BSDE system: 
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Yt = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
F (s,Xs,Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zs)
T dWs,
where the coefficients Σ, F and g satisfy the following condition:
|g(x1)− g(x2)|2 ≤ gx|x1 − x2|2,
‖Σ(t,x1)− Σ(t,x2)‖2F ≤ Σx|x1 − x2|2,
|F (t,x1,p1)− F (t,x2,p2)|2 ≤ Fx|x1 − x2|2 + Fz‖p1 − p2‖2F ,
‖Σ(t,x)‖2F ≤MΣ.
Then:
‖Zt‖2S ≤MΣeFzT [gxeΣxT + Fx
eΣxT − 1
FzΣx
] L× P-a.s.,
where ‖ · ‖S denotes the spectral norm and L is the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ].
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Proof. Denote by (Xt,xs ,Y
t,x
s ,Z
t,x
s )t≤s≤T the solution of the following BSDE:
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
Σ(u,Xt,xu ) dWu,
Y t,xs = g(X
t,x
T ) +
∫ T
s
F (u,Xt,xu ,Z
t,x
u ) du−
∫ T
t
(Zt,xu )
T dWu,
for any (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. Then, for any t0 ∈ [0, T ] and x1,x2 ∈ Rn, let (Xjt ,Y jt ,Zjt ) be the short
notation3 for (X
t0,xj
t ,Y
t0,xj
t ,Z
t0,xj
t ), j = 1, 2, t ∈ [t0, T ]. The wellposedness of BSDEs (1) and (4.1) is
classical in literature; see, e.g., [51].
We define δXt, δYt, δZt, δFt and δΣt as follows:
δXt = X
1
t −X2t , δYt = Y 1t − Y 2t , δZt = Z1t −Z2t ,
δFt = F (t,X
1
t ,Z
1
t )− F (t,X2t ,Z2t ), δΣt = Σ(t,X1t )− Σ(t,X2t ).
Then, we have
dδXt = δΣt dWt,
dδYt = −δFt dt+ (δZt)T dWt,
and Itoˆ’s lemma gives
d|δXt|2 = ‖δΣt‖2F dt+ 2(δXt)TδΣt dWt,
d|δYt|2 =
[−2δFt · δYt + ‖δZt‖2F ] dt+ 2(δZtδYt)T dWt.
Taking the expectation on both sides yields
E|δXt|2 = |x1 − x2|2 +
∫ t
t0
E‖δΣs‖2F ds ≤ |x1 − x2|2 + Σx
∫ t
t0
E|δXs|2 ds,
and by Gro¨nwall’s inequality, we have E|δXt|2 ≤ eΣx(t−t0)|x1 − x2|2. Similarly, we deduce that
E|δYt|2 = E|δYT |2 +
∫ T
t
E
[
2δFs · δYs − ‖δZs‖2F
]
ds
≤ gxE|δXT |2 +
∫ T
t
{
FzE|δYs|2 + F−1z E|δFs|2 − E‖δZs‖2F
}
ds
≤ gxE|δXT |2 +
∫ T
t
{
FzE|δYs|2 + F−1z
[
FxE|δXs|2 + FzE‖δZs‖2F
]− E‖δZs‖2F} ds
≤
[
gxe
Σx(T−t0) + Fx
eΣx(T−t0) − eΣx(t−t0)
FzΣx
]
|x1 − x2|2 + Fz
∫ T
t
E|δYs|2 ds
≤
[
gxe
Σx(T−t0) + Fx
eΣx(T−t0) − 1
FzΣx
]
|x1 − x2|2 + Fz
∫ T
t
E|δYs|2 ds,
and by Gro¨nwall’s inequality, we have
|δYt0 |2 ≤ eFz(T−t0)
[
gxe
Σx(T−t0) + Fx
eΣx(T−t0) − 1
FzΣx
]
|x1 − x2|2. (25)
Following the argument in [45, Theorem 3.1], we define u(t,x) = Y t,xt and deduce |u(t0,x1) −
u(t0,x2)|2 ≤ L|x1 − x2|2 from (25), where L = eFzT [gxeΣxT + Fx eΣxT−1FzΣx ]. Therefore, we claim
‖∇xu(t,x)‖2S ≤ L a.s. with the Lebesgue measure on Rn, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
3The notation here is slightly inconsistent with the statement in Section 2: A boldface character with a superscript j
denotes a solution with the jth initial condition (t0,xj).
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Also noticing that Zt = (Σ
T∇xu)(t,Xt) P-a.s. (cf. [45, Theorem 3.1]),
‖(ΣT∇xu)(t,x)‖2S ≤ ‖Σ(t,x)‖2S‖∇xu(t,x)‖2S ≤ ‖Σ(t,x)‖2FL ≤MΣL,
and the law of Xt is absolute continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn, we can get
‖Zt‖2S ≤MΣL P-a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, since Zt is measurable with respect to L([0, T ]) × F , where L([0, T ]) denotes the collection of
Lebesgue measurable sets on [0, T ], we obtain our conclusion.
Using the above lemma, we can prove that the solution to the BSDE system (8) has a bounded Z-
component, for sufficiently small T . The standard estimate can not be applied directly here, as the driver
Hˇ defined in (8) is not global Lipschitz in p. Thus we provide the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for sufficiently small time duration T (only depending on the
constants involved in Assumption 2), there exists a unique adapted solution of the BSDE system (8) such
that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(|Xt|2 + |Yt|2) +
∫ T
0
‖Zt‖2F dt
]
< +∞.
Moreover,
‖Zt‖2S ≤ 2MΣgx L× P-a.s..
Proof. We first prove the existence. Fix M > 0, we use PM (Z) to denote the projection from Rk×N
to {Z ∈ Rk×N : ‖Z‖2S ≤ M}, and use PM (Z)i for its ith column. Let H˜ = [H˜1, . . . , H˜N ]T with
H˜i(t,x,p) = φ(t,x,α(t,x,p)) · PM (p)i + f i(t,x,α(t,x,p)), then its Lipschitz constants with respect
to x and p are computed by
|H˜(t,x1,p1)− H˜(t,x2,p2)|2
≤ 3M |φ(t,x1,α(t,x1,p1))− φ(t,x2,α(t,x2,p2))|2 + 3Mφ‖PM (p1)− PM (p2)‖2F
+ 3|f(t,x1,α(t,x1,p1))− f(t,x2,α(t,x2,p2))|2
≤ 3(Mφx + fx)|x1 − x2|2 + 3Mφ‖p1 − p2‖2F + 3(Mφα + fα)|α(t,x1,p1)−α(t,x2,p2)|2
≤ 3[Mφx + fx + (Mφα + fα)αx]|x1 − x2|2 + 3[Mφ + (Mφα + fα)αp]‖p1 − p2‖2F .
Now define M = 2MΣgx and consider the solution (Xt, Y˜t, Z˜t) to the following BSDE system
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Y˜t = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xs, Z˜s) ds−
∫ T
t
(Z˜s)
T dWs.
Following Lemma 1 and using the definition of M , we have:
‖Z˜t‖2S ≤MΣe3[Mφ+(2MΣgxφα+fα)αp]T
×
[
gxe
ΣxT + 3 [2MΣgxφx + fx + (2MΣgxφα + fα)αx]
eΣxT − 1
3Σx[Mφ + (2MΣgxφα + fα)αp]
]
:= M(T ).
Therefore, if M(T ) ≤ 2MΣgx, (Xt, Y˜t, Z˜t) is the desired solution to the BSDE system (8) with ‖Z˜t‖2S ≤
2MΣgx, which can be fulfilled if T is small enough.
We then prove the uniqueness. Let (Xt,Y
′
t ,Z
′
t) be another adapted solution of the BSDE system (8)
such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(|Xt|2 + |Y ′t |2) +
∫ T
0
‖Z ′t‖2F dt
]
< +∞.
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Define δYt = Y
′
t − Y˜t, δZt = Z ′t − Z˜t and δHt = Hˇ(t,Xt,Z ′t)− Hˇ(t,Xt, Z˜t) and we can write
dδYt = −δHt dt+ δZt dWt.
Itoˆ’s lemma gives
d|δYt|2 = [−2δYt · δHt + ‖δZt‖2F ] dt+ 2(δZtδYt)T dWt.
Taking expectation on both side and using δYT = 0, we deduce that
E|δYt|2 +
∫ T
t
E‖δZs‖2F ds = 2
∫ T
t
E[δHs · δYs] ds ≤ λ
∫ T
t
E|δYs|2 ds+ λ−1
∫ T
t
E|δHs|2 ds, (26)
for any λ > 0. By
δHt = φ(t,Xt,α(t,Xt,Z
′
t)) ·Z ′t − φ(t,Xt,α(t,Xt, Z˜t) · Z˜t
+ f(t,Xt,α(t,Xt,Z
′
t))− f(t,Xt,α(t,Xt, Z˜t))
= φ(t,Xt,α(t,Xt,Z
′
t)) · (Z ′t − Z˜t) + [φ(t,Xt,α(t,Xt,Z ′t))− φ(t,Xt,α(t,Xt, Z˜t)] · Z˜t
+ f(t,Xt,α(t,Xt,Z
′
t))− f(t,Xt,α(t,Xt, Z˜t)),
we have |δHt|2 ≤ Lz‖δZt‖2F with Lz = 3[Mφ+2MΣgxφααp+fααp]. Taking λ = Lz in (26), we deduce that
E|δYt|2 ≤ Lz
∫ T
t
E|δYs|2 ds and therefore Y ′t ≡ Y˜t by Gro¨nwall’s inequality. We then have
∫ T
0
E‖δZt‖2F dt =
0 from the first equality in (26), which implies Z ′t ≡ Z˜t.
Recalling that m is the index of the stage in the decoupling step, now we present the main result in
this section regarding its convergence.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for sufficiently small time duration T , there exist two constants
C > 0 and 0 < q < 1 such that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|Y mt − Yt|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zmt −Zt‖2F dt+
∫ T
0
E|αmt −α∗t |2 dt ≤ Cqm
∫ T
0
E|α0t −α∗t |2 dt, (27)
where (Y mt ,Z
m
t ) is defined by
Y mt = [Y
1,m
t , . . . , Y
N,m
t ]
T, Zmt = [Z
1,m
t , . . . , Z
N,m
t ]
with (Y i,mt , Z
i,m
t ) from the BSDE systems (14) or (16), (Yt,Zt) is defined in (8) , α
m
t = α
m(t,Xt) and
α∗t = α
∗(t,Xt). Note that the choice of T,C, q only depend on the constants involved in Assumption 2.
Proof. Theorem 2 states the convergence of both fictitious play (according to (14)) and policy update
(according to (16)). The proofs of these two are very similar, and we shall focus on fictitious play method
for brevity.
To perform convergence analysis, we first rewrite the BSDE systems to show the explicit dependence
on the players’ strategies. For (8), it reads as
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Yt = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
H(s,Xs,α
∗
s,Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zs)
T dWs,
α∗t = a(t,Xt,α
∗
t ,Zt),
(28)
where H,a are defined in (5) and (6). The rewritten system of (14) is
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs,
Y m+1t = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Hˆ(s,Xs,α
m
s ,α
m+1
s ,Z
m+1
s ) ds−
∫ T
t
(Zm+1s )
T dWs,
αm+1t = a(t,Xt,α
m
t ,Z
m+1
t ),
(29)
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where Hˆ = [Hˆ1, . . . , HˆN ]T, Hˆi(t,x,β,γ,p) ≡ Hi(t,x, (γi,β−i), pi) and pi stands for the ith column of p.
Note that this is slightly an abuse of notation with (15), to show the driver’s explicit dependence on αm+1.
Also note that the rewritten system (29) is simply a condensed form of (14), concatenating all Y i,mt into
Y mt , without changing its decoupled nature. This will also ease the notation in the following proof.
We now define δHmt = Hˆ(t,Xt,α
m
t ,α
m+1
t ,Z
m+1
t )−H(t,Xt,α∗t ,Zt). According to Lemma 2, we have
‖Zt‖2S ≤ 2MΣgx, and consequently,
δHi,mt = φ(t,Xt, (α
i,m+1
t ,α
−i,m
t )) · Zi,m+1t + f i(t,Xt, (αi,m+1t ,α−i,mt ))
− φ(t,Xt,α∗t ) · Zit − f i(t,Xt,α∗t )
= φ(t,Xt, (α
i,m+1
t ,α
−i,m
t )) · (Zi,m+1t − Zit) + [φ(t,Xt, (αi,m+1t ,α−i,mt ))− φ(t,Xt,αmt )] · Zit
+ [φ(t,Xt,α
m
t )− φ(t,Xt,α∗t )] · Zit + [f i(t,Xt, (αi,m+1t ,α−i,mt ))− f i(t,Xt,αmt )]
+ [f i(t,Xt,α
m
t )− f i(t,Xt,α∗t )].
Therefore,
|δHmt |2 ≤ 5Mφ‖Zm+1t −Zt‖2F + 5
N∑
i=1
|Zit |2φα|αi,m+1t − αi,mt |2 + 5‖Zt‖2Sφα|αmt −α∗t |2
+ 5
N∑
i=1
fα|αi,m+1t − αi,mt |2 + 5fα|αmt −α∗t |2
≤ 5Mφ‖Zm+1t −Zt‖2F + (10φαMΣgx + 5fα)
[
2|αmt −α∗t |2 + |αm+1t −α∗t |2
]
.
Next, we define δY mt = Y
m
t −Yt, δZmt = Zmt −Zt, δαmt = αmt −α∗t . Subtracting (28) from (29) gives
dδY m+1t = −δHmt dt+ δZm+1t dWt.
Using Itoˆ’s lemma and taking expectation on both sides, we have
E|δY m+1t |2 +
∫ T
t
E‖δZm+1s ‖2F ds = 2
∫ T
t
E[δHms · δY m+1s ] ds.
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, for any λ > 0, one has
E|δY m+1t |2 +
∫ T
t
E‖δZm+1s ‖2F ds
≤ λ
∫ T
t
E|δY m+1s |2 ds+ λ−1
∫ T
t
E|δHms |2 ds
≤ λ
∫ T
t
E|δY m+1s |2 ds
+ λ−1
∫ T
t
{
5MφE‖δZm+1s ‖2F + (10φαMΣgx + 5fα)
[
2E|δαms |2 + E|δαm+1s |2
]}
ds. (30)
Choosing λ = 5Mφ in the above inequality yields
E|δY m+1t |2 ≤ 5Mφ
∫ T
t
E|δY m+1s |2 ds+
2φαMΣgx + fα
Mφ
∫ T
t
{
2E|δαms |2 + E|δαm+1s |2
}
ds.
By Gro¨nwall’s inequality, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E|δY m+1t |2 ≤ e5MφT
2φαMΣgx + fα
Mφ
∫ T
0
{
2E|δαmt |2 + E|δαm+1t |2
}
dt. (31)
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Choosing a constant λ > 5Mφ and using inequality (30) again produce∫ T
0
E‖δZm+1t ‖2F dt
≤ λ
2
λ− 5Mφ
∫ T
0
E|δY m+1t |2 dt+
10φαMΣgx + 5fα
λ− 5Mφ
∫ T
0
{
2E|δαmt |2 + E|δαm+1t |2
}
dt
≤ 10φαMΣgx + 5fα
λ− 5Mφ
[
λ2Te5MφT
5Mφ
+ 1
] ∫ T
0
{
2E|δαmt |2 + E|δαm+1t |2
}
dt
:= Cz(λ)
∫ T
0
{
2E|δαmt |2 + E|δαm+1t |2
}
dt. (32)
Using the Lipschitz condition of the function a and estimate (32) imply that∫ T
0
E|δαm+1t |2 dt ≤
∫ T
0
{
aαE|δαmt |2 + apE‖δZm+1t ‖2F
}
dt
≤ (aα + 2apCz(λ))
∫ T
0
E|δαmt |2 dt+ apCz(λ)
∫ T
0
E|δαm+1t |2 dt. (33)
If 0 <
aα+2apCz(λ)
1−apCz(λ) < 1, the claim (27) follows by the estimates (31), (32) and (33), and we are done with
the proof. To this end, we only need to have Cz(λ) < min{ 1ap , 1−aα3ap } as aα < 1. To this end, we can first
choose λ 1 such that 10φαMΣgx+5fαλ−5Mφ  1, and then choose T  1 such that λ
2Te5MφT
5Mφ
 1, which leads
to Cz(λ) 1.
4.2 Numerical Error Analysis
This section is dedicated to analyzing the numerical error introduced by the deep BSDE method when
solving each sub-problem. Specifically, we aim to control the distance between (Xt,Yt,Zt) defined in (8)
and the discrete system (Xpitk ,Y
pi,m
tk
,Zpi,mtk ) satisfying:{
Xpitk+1 = X
pi
tk
+ Σ(tk,X
pi
tk
)∆Wk, X
pi
0 = x0,
Y pi,m+1tk+1 = Y
pi,m+1
tk
− hm(tk,Xpitk ,Zpi,m+1tk )∆tk + (Zpi,m+1tk )T∆Wk,
(34)
where hm is either [h1,m, · · · , hN,m]T with hi,m(t,x,p) = infαi∈Ai Hi(t,x, (αi,α−i,pi,m(t,x)),p) when de-
coupled through fictitious play, or hm(t,x,p) = H(t,x,αpi,m(t,x),p) when decoupled through policy
update. As stated in Section 3.2, Y pi,m+10 and Z
pi,m+1
tk
are paramterized by neural networks,
Y pi,m+10 = ψ
m+1
0 (X
pi
0 ), Z
pi,m+1
tk
= φm+1k (X
pi
tk
),
where ψm0 and {φmk }NT−1k=0 are the optimal deterministic maps determined at stage m that belongs to the
hypothesis spaces (cf. Section 3.2). Afterwards, the (m+1)th-stage policies defined on T ×Rn are updated
by:
αpi,m+1(t,x) = a(t,x,αpi,m(t,x),φm+1(t,x)), ∀(t,x) ∈ T × Rn (35)
where φm(tk,x) = φ
m
k (x). Note that the above notation is simply a vector form of the deep BSDE
method applied to system (14) or (16). It does not change the decoupling nature of the deep fictitious play
algorithm, i.e., each entry (Y i,pi,m, Zi,pi,m) in (Y pi,m,Zpi,m) still solves its own problem.
Initially, we hope to apply Theorem 1 to the BSDE system (14) and (16). By the game feature and
the decoupling scheme, stage m + 1’s estimates rely on the regularity of stage m’s policy αm(t,x) (see
definition in (13)). Specifically, it requires the following condition, in addition to Assumption 2:
|αm(t1,x1)−αm(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2].
However, in general, this property is not inherited from stage to stage. To circumvent this issue, we
introduce a projection operator PNpi , which needs to be applied at the end of each stage. Along this line,
we need the following assumption.
14
Assumption 3. The optimal policy α∗ as a function on [0, T ] × Rn is Lipschitz with respect to x and
1/2-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to t, i.e.,
|α∗(t1,x1)−α∗(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L(|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2).
We also assume that |α∗(t,x)|2 ≤ L(1 + |x|2) for any (t,x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Recall the set T containing all endpoints of the partition pi on [0, T ] from (19), we define a Hilbert
space on T × Rn:
Hpi =
{
α : measurable functions from T × Rn to RNdα ,
NT−1∑
k=0
E|α(tk,Xpitk)|2∆tk < +∞
}
,
with norm ‖α‖2Hpi :=
∑NT−1
k=0 E|α(tk,Xpitk)|2∆tk, and a subset
N pi = {α : T × Rn ↪→ RNdα , |α(t1,x1)−α(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2], |α(t,x)|2 ≤ L′(1 + |x|2)} 4
with a constant L′ ≥ L. We claim that N pi is a closed convex subset of Hpi, so the projection PNpi from
Hpi to N pi exists and does not increase distance (cf., [7, Chapter 5]):
‖PNpif1 − PNpif2‖Hpi ≤ ‖f1 − f2‖Hpi ∀f1, f2 ∈ Hpi. (36)
The convexity of N pi is straightforward. To see the closedness, let {αj}j≥1 be a convergent sequence in
N pi, then there exists a subsequence of {αj}j≥1, denoted by {αjk}k≥1, that converges to α∞ a.s.. Since
|αjk(t1,x1)−αjk(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2], |αjk(t,x)|2 ≤ L′(1 + |x|2),
and let k → +∞, we obtain
|α∞(t1,x1)−α∞(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2], |α∞(t,x)|2 ≤ L′(1 + |x|2), a.s..
Noticing that the functions in N pi and Hpi are identical if they agree almost everywhere, we can conclude
α∞ ∈ N pi and N pi is closed.
Therefore, we are able to apply the projection operator PNpi at the end of each stage, i.e., we change
equation (35) to
α˜pi,m+1(t,x) = a(t,x,αpi,m(t,x),φm+1(t,x)), (37)
αpi,m+1 = PNpi (α˜pi,m+1).
The main theorem in this section is as follows.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1–3, let αpi,0 be a measurable function from T × Rn to A satisfying:
|αpi,0(t1,x1)−αpi,0(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2], |αpi,0(t,x)|2 ≤ L′(1 + |x|2). (38)
Then, if T is sufficiently small, we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Yt − Y pi,mpi(t) |2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zpi,mpi(t)‖2F dt+
∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt
≤ C
‖pi‖+ qm ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣α∗t −αpi,0pi(t)∣∣∣2 dt+ m∑
j=1
qm−jE
∣∣∣g(XpiT )− Y pi,jT ∣∣∣2
 , (39)
where (Xpitk ,Y
pi,m
tk
,Zpi,mtk ) is defined in (34), α
pi,m
pi(t) ≡ αpi,mtk = αpi,m(tk,Xpitk) for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), and C > 0,
0 < q < 1 are two constants depending only on T , L′ and the constants involved in Assumption 2, which
4Note that here t1 and t2 refer to two arbitrary points in T , but not the first and second endpoints in the partition pi.
Later, depending on the contexts, the notation t1 and t2 in |t1 − t2| may also refer to arbitrary points in [0, T ].
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may vary from line to line in the proof. Here (Xpitk ,Y
pi,m
tk
,Zpi,mtk ) represents either the discrete BSDE system
using fictitious play or policy update in the decoupling step, depending on the definition of h in (34).
Moreover, if we define (Y mt ,Z
m
t ) as
Y mt = [Y
1,m
t , . . . , Y
N,m
t ]
T, Zmt = [Z
1.m
t , . . . , Z
N,m
t ]
with (Y i,mt , Z
i,m
t ) from the BSDE systems (14) in the setting of fictitious play or (16) in the setting of
policy update, in which the previous stage policy is given by the extension of the numerical approximation
in time
αm(t,x) = inf
t′∈T
[αpi,m(t′,x) + L′|t′ − t| 12 ], (40)
we have
inf
ψm0 ∈N ′0,{φmk ∈Nk}
NT−1
k=0
E|g(XpiT )− Y pi,mT |2
≤ C
[
‖pi‖+ inf
ψm0 ∈N ′0,{φmk ∈Nk}
NT−1
k=0
{
E|Y m0 −ψm0 (x0)|2 +
NT−1∑
k=0
E‖Zˆmtk − φmk (Xpitk)‖2F∆tk
}]
, (41)
where Zˆmtk = (∆tk)
−1E[
∫ tk+1
tk
Zmt dt|Xpitk ].
Remark 2. We have the following remarks regarding Theorem 3:
(1) The interpretation of Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1. The first inequality (39) shows that
the distance between the true solution of BSDE (8) and the output of the deep BSDE method at stage
m can be controlled together by the mesh size, the error of the initial policy and the loss functions
achieved at all the previous stages. The second inequality (41) states that the loss function of deep
BSDE method at each stage is small if the approximation capability of the parametric function spaces
( (N ′0 and {Nk}NT−1k=0 ) is high. The overall message conveyed in Theorem 3 is that, if the deep BSDE
method can solve each sub-problem accurately enough, the deep fictitious play method will produce a
strategy close to the Nash equilibrium.
(2) Note that there is a slight abuse of notation in the statement of Theorem 3, since (Y mt ,Z
m
t ) and α
m
have already been introduced in Sections 4.1 and 3.1, as the theoretical solution from the decoupling
step at stage m. In this section, to avoid introducing further complicated notations, we still refer
(Y mt ,Z
m
t ) as the theoretical solution depending on α
m−1, but αm−1 is the interpolation (40) of the
deep BSDE solution αpi,m−1 at stage m − 1. Nevertheless, some estimates, in particular, equations
(31)–(33), derived in Theorem 2 in Section 4.1 still applies, with an argument similar to the original
proof. This new definition is indeed needed to apply Theorem 1 on (Y pi,mpi(t) ,Z
pi,m
pi(t) ) and (Y
m
t ,Z
m
t ), and
the particular form (40) ensures that the Ho¨lder continuity, as a prerequisite of Theorem 1, is preserved
after the extension (cf. [46]).
(3) Also we still refer N ′0 and Nk as the hypothesis spaces for ψm0 : Rn → RN , φmk := Rn → Rk×N , without
introducing superscript m to indicate the stage.
Proof. Since αpi,m ∈ N pi, with the condition (38) and (40), we can obtain (cf. [46])
|αm(t1,x1)−αm(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2], |αm(t,x)| ≤ L′(1 +
√
‖pi‖+ |x|2). (42)
Thus, the inequality (41) follows from Theorem 1.
We next prove the inequality (39). As before, we will focus on proving the case of fictitious play in the
sequel, and we claim that the statements also hold for policy update using a similar argument.
We first need error estimates on the BSDE (8)’s Euler-type scheme. To this end, we recall the following
result (see [64, 48]) on the generic BSDE (17) for notation brevity:
Xpitk+1 = X
pi
tk
+ µ(tk, X
pi
tk
)∆tk + Σ(tk, X
pi
tk
)∆Wk, X
pi
0 = x,
Y pitk = E[Y
pi
tk+1
|Xtk ] + F (tk, Xpitk , Zpitk)∆tk, Y piT = g(XpiT ),
Zpitk =
1
∆tk
E[(Y pitk+1)
T∆Wk|Xpitk ], ∀k = 0, 1, . . . , NT − 1.
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With the same assumptions stated in Theorem 1, one has the following estimate of the discretization error:
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Xt −Xpipi(t)|2 + E|Yt − Y pipi(t)|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zt − Zpipi(t)‖2F dt ≤ C‖pi‖,
where (Xt, Yt, Zt) solves (17) and C is a constant depending only on L appearing in Theorem 1.
In the sequel, we use {Y pitk}0≤k≤NT , {Zpitk}0≤k≤NT−1 to denote the above Euler scheme for BSDE (8). The
discretized X-component coincides with {Xpitk}0≤k≤NT defined in (34), so we will stick to this notation. It is
straightforward to see that, under Assumptions 2–3, the BSDE (8) satisfies the assumptions in Theorem 1,
so one has:
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Xt −Xpipi(t)|2 ≤ C‖pi‖, (43)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Yt − Y pipi(t)|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zpipi(t)‖2F dt ≤ C‖pi‖.
For the Z-part error, we decompose it into two terms by the AM-GM inequality, for any λ > 0:∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zpi,m+1pi(t) ‖2F dt ≤ (1 + λ−1)
∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zm+1t ‖2F dt+ (1 + λ)
∫ T
0
E‖Zm+1t −Zpi,m+1pi(t) ‖2F dt. (44)
A similar inequality can be written on the Y -part error. For both of them, the second term is taken care
by applying Theorem 1 to (Y mt ,Z
m
t ). More precisely, under Assumptions 2–3 and (42), one has:
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|Y m+1t − Y pi,m+1pi(t) |2 +
∫ T
0
E‖Zm+1t −Zpi,m+1pi(t) ‖2F dt ≤ C
[
‖pi‖+ E|Y pi,m+1T − g(XpiT )|2
]
, (45)
where (Y pi,mpi(t) ,Z
pi,m
pi(t) ) is defined in (34). For the first term in (44), we recall (32) and (33) and deduce∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zm+1t ‖2F dt ≤ Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
] ∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αm(t,Xt)|2 dt
≤ (1 + λ−1)Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
] ∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt+ Cλ‖pi‖, (46)
for Cz(λ) < a
−1
p , where we have used∫ T
0
E|αpi,mpi(t) −αm(t,Xt)|2 dt ≤ C‖pi‖ (47)
as a consequence of (42) and (43), and Cλ is a constant depending on T and the constants involved in
Assumption 2 and λ. Combining (44), (45) and (46), we claim that the Z-part error in (39) is obtained if
(1 + λ−1)2Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα+2apCz(λ)
1−apCz(λ)
]
< 1. A similar conclusion on Y -part is obtained using equations (45),
(31), (33) and (47).
We next derive an estimate that is useful in controlling the α-part error. For any constant λ > 0, we
compute:
NT−1∑
k=0
E‖Zpitk −Zpi,m+1tk ‖2F∆tk =
∫ T
0
E‖Zpipi(t) −Zpi,m+1pi(t) ‖2F dt
≤ (1 + λ−1)
∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zm+1t ‖2F dt+ 2(1 + λ)
[∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zpipi(t)‖2F + E‖Zm+1t −Zpi,m+1pi(t) ‖2F dt
]
≤ (1 + λ−1)
∫ T
0
E‖Zt −Zm+1t ‖2F dt+ Cλ
[
‖pi‖+ E|Y pi,m+1T − g(XpiT )|2
]
≤ (1 + λ−1)2Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
] ∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt
+ Cλ
[
‖pi‖+ E|Y pi,m+1T − g(XpiT )|2
]
, (48)
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where we have used the AM-GM inequality and (46). Here Cλ is a constant depending on T , L
′, Lα, the
constants involved in Assumption 2 and λ, which may vary from line to line in the following derivations.
For the α-part error
∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt in (39), we plan to
(1) express I :=
∑NT−1
k=0 E|α∗ − α˜pi,m+1|2(tk,Xpitk)∆tk in terms of
∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt;
(2) obtain the estimate of II :=
∑NT−1
k=0 E|α∗ −αpi,m+1|2(tk,Xpitk)∆tk ≤ I by the property (36) of PNpi ;
(3) take care the difference between the α-part error and II:
III :=
∫ T
0
E|α∗t −α∗(pi(t),Xpipi(t))|2 dt ≤ C‖pi‖. (49)
Step (2) follows from the fact that αpi,m+1 is defined as the projection of α˜pi,m+1 into N pi, and that
α∗ ∈ N pi if viewed as a function on T × Rn. Step (3) is a consequence of Assumption 3 and (43). So it
remains to address step (1).
To this end, we defineαpi,∗tk = α(tk,X
pi
tk
,Zpitk), thenα
pi,∗
tk
= a(tk,X
pi
tk
,αpi,∗tk ,Z
pi
tk
), and α˜pi,mtk = α˜
pi,m(tk,X
pi
tk
),
then α˜pi,m+1tk = a(tk,X
pi
tk
,αpi,mtk ,Z
pi,m+1
tk
). Thus,
I ≤ (1 + λ−1)
NT−1∑
k=0
E|αpi,∗tk − α˜pi,m+1tk |2∆tk + Cλ
NT−1∑
k=0
E|αpi,∗tk −α∗(tk,Xpitk)|2∆tk
:= (1 + λ−1)I(1) + CλI(2). (50)
For term I(1), using (48) and the Lipschitz condition of a in (37), we obtain
I(1) ≤
NT−1∑
k=0
[
apE‖Zpitk −Zpi,m+1tk ‖2F + aαE|αpi,∗tk −αpi,mtk |2
]
∆tk
≤
[
ap(1 + λ
−1)2Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
]
+ aα(1 + λ
−1)
] ∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt
+ Cλ
[
‖pi‖+ E|Y pi,m+1T − g(XpiT )|2
]
,
where we have also used∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,∗pi(t)|2 dt =
∫ T
0
E|α(t,Xt,Zt)−α(pi(t),Xpipi(t),Zpipi(t))|2 dt ≤ C‖pi‖.
Combining the last inequality with (49) yields the estimate for term I(2):
I(2) ≤ C‖pi‖.
Now plugging the estimates of I(1) and I(2) into (50) and following step (1)–(3), we obtain:∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,m+1pi(t) |2 dt
≤ (1 + λ−1)II + CλIII ≤ (1 + λ−1)I + CλIII ≤ (1 + λ−1)2I(1) + Cλ(I(2) + III)
≤
[
ap(1 + λ
−1)4Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
]
+ aα(1 + λ
−1)3
] ∫ T
0
E|α∗t −αpi,mpi(t)|2 dt
+ Cλ
[
‖pi‖+ E|Y pi,m+1T − g(XpiT )|2
]
.
Hence, the α-part error in (39) can be derived, if ap(1+λ
−1)4Cz(λ)
[
2 +
aα+2apCz(λ)
1−apCz(λ)
]
+aα(1+λ
−1)3 < 1,
which is fulfilled for λ 1 and sufficiently small T via a similar argument as in Theorem 2.
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Here are some remarks regarding Theorem 3 on its implication for numerical algorithms. The primary
concern is how we can implement the projection mapping in practice if wished. Note that we choose
1/2-Ho¨lder continuity in time in Assumption 3 for the generality of the result, although numerically it is
challenging to guarantee the Ho¨lder continuity. If we replace that with the Lipschitz continuity in time, as a
more restrictive condition, and instead consider the projection onto the space with the Lipschitz continuity,
the estimates still hold. Accordingly, there are some practical approaches in the literature on ensuring the
Lipschitz continuity of deep neural networks that can be introduced in our algorithms. For instance, [20]
gives an efficient and accurate estimation of Lipschitz constants for deep Neural networks, and [54] further
extends it for robust training with regularization to keep the Lipschitz constant of neural networks small.
In practice, Wasserstein GAN [2, 25] has shown remarkable performance when using weight clipping as a
loose but efficient way to impose the Lipschitz constraint. Therefore we can leverage similar techniques to
keep the Lipschitz regularity during the training of the deep fictitious play. Also, notice that in the above,
we define a single projection N pi from the space of all players’ strategies αpi,m, in consideration of the
simplicity of the statement. One can also use the projection of αi,pi,m for each player with possibly easier
numerical implementation and the same theoretical guarantee.
4.3 On the -Nash Equilibrium
This section combines the previous analysis, identifies the -Nash equilibrium produced by the deep fictitious
play, and evaluates its performance on the original game.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1–3, if αˆ is a policy function on [0, T ]× Rn and Lipschitz in x, and∫ T
0
E|α∗ − αˆ|2(t,Xt) dt ≤ , (51)
where Xt is the forward component of (8), then
(1) Given αˆ, the game values produced by αˆ are near the Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
|J˜0(αˆ)− J0(α∗)|2 ≤ C, and |J0(αˆ)− J0(α∗)|2 ≤ C, (52)
where J˜0(αˆ) = [J˜
1
0 (αˆ), . . . , J˜
N
0 (αˆ)] with J˜
i
0(αˆ) := infβi∈Ai J
i
0(β
i, αˆ−i), J0(αˆ) = [J10 (αˆ), . . . , J
N
0 (αˆ)]
with J i0 defined in (3). Thus, there exists 0 < i  1 such that
∑N
i=1 
2
i ≤ C and
J i0(β
i, αˆ−i) ≥ J i0(αˆ)− i, ∀βi ∈ Ai and i ∈ I. (53)
Here C is a constant depending on the coefficients involved in Assumptions 2–3 and T , which may
vary from line to line in the proof.
(2) The generated game paths Xαˆt are close to the paths X
α∗
t associated to the Nash equilibrium:
E
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣Xα∗t −Xαˆt ∣∣∣)2
]
≤ Cλλ,
where Xα
∗
t and X
αˆ
t follow (1) with the true Nash equilibrium strategy α
∗ and αˆ. Here λ is an arbitrary
constant in (0, 1), and Cλ is a constant depending on the coefficients involved in Assumptions 2–3, T
and λ.
Immediately, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–3, assuming the sub-problems (34) are solved accurate enough at all
stages, i.e.,
E|g(XpiT )− Y pi,jT |2 ≤ C2, ∀j ≤ m, (54)
here C is a constant depending only on the coefficients involved in Assumptions 2–3 and T. Then, for
sufficiently large m and small mesh size ‖pi‖, the strategy αm defined in (40), as an interpolated policy
based on the deep fictitious play, forms an -Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. This follows from (53) in Theorem 4, with the assumptions satisfied according to equations (39),
(42) and (47).
Remark 3. As mentioned in Remark 1, there are still some theoretical issues unsolved regarding the
approximation error and optimization of the deep BSDE method. The analysis of the deep fictitious play
method has similar issues that remain open. To circumvent these issues and have a rigorous statement for
-Nash equilibrium, we introduce assumption (54). In practice, an observable proxy of (54) is the training
loss of the deep BSDE method evaluated by its Monte Carlo counterpart.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof of item (1) relies on the estimates of BSDEs presented previously. Let
(Xt, Y
i,FP
t , Z
i,FP
t ) solves (14) with α
−i,m replaced by αˆ−i. By the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula (cf.
[52, 18, 53]) and the associated HJB equation, we have E[Y i,FP0 ] = J˜ i0(αˆ). Therefore, we have
|J˜0(αˆ)− J0(α∗)|2 = |E[Y FP0 ]− E[Y0]|2 ≤ E|Y FP0 − Y0|2. (55)
To bound the above term, we claim a stronger result:
sup
0≤t≤T
E|Y FPt − Yt|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖ZFPt −Zt‖2F dt ≤ C, (56)
where (Yt,Zt) solves (8), Y
FP
t = [Y
1,FP
t , . . . , Y
N,FP
t ]
T, and ZFPt = [Z
i,FP
t , . . . , Z
N,FP
t ].
The proof of (56) essentially follow the same argument as in Theorem 2 with replacing αm by αˆt, α
m+1
t
by βt := a(t,Xt, αˆ,Z
FP
t ), Y
m+1
t by Y
FP
t and Z
m+1
t by Z
FP
t . More precisely, following the derivation of
(31) and (32), with λ > 5Mφ, one has
sup
0≤t≤T
E|Y FPt − Yt|2 +
∫ T
0
E‖ZFPt −Zt‖2F dt
≤
[
e5MφT
2φαMΣgx + fα
Mφ
+ Cz(λ)
] ∫ T
0
E|βt −α∗|2 + 2E|αˆt −α∗t |2 dt,
where Cz(λ) =
10φαMΣgx+5fα
λ−5Mφ
[
λ2Te5MφT
5Mφ
+ 1
]
. Similarly, from (33), we deduce
∫ T
0
E|βt −α∗|2 dt ≤ aα + 2apCz(λ)
1− apCz(λ)
∫ T
0
E|αˆt −α∗t |2 dt.
Combing the above two equations with (51) gives (56). By (55) and (56), we have the first equality in (52).
If we let (Xt, Y
i,PU
t , Z
i,PU
t ) solve (16) with α
m replaced by αˆ, an argument similar to (55) and (56)
can give the second inequality in (52). Then (53) is obtained by observing
J i0(β
i, αˆ−i) ≥ J˜ i0(αˆ), ∀βi ∈ Ai,
and |J˜0(αˆ)− J0(αˆ)|2 ≤ C.
We now prove item (2). Under the standing assumptions, we first observe that b1(t,x) := b(t,x,α∗(t,x)) =
Σ(t,x)φ(t,x,α∗(t,x)) and b2(t,x) := b(t,x, αˆ(t,x)) = Σ(t,x)φ(t,x, αˆ(t,x)) are Lipschitz in x. Thus Xαˆt
is well-defined, and the standard estimates in SDE gives (cf. [65, Theorem 3.2.4])
E
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣Xα∗t −Xαˆt ∣∣∣)2
]
≤ CE
(∫ T
0
b1(t,Xα
∗
t )− b2(t,Xα
∗
t ) dt
)2 . (57)
To bound the right-hand side above with the condition (51), let us define a new probability measure
Q, and denote by Z the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
dQ
dP
≡ Z := exp
{
−
∫ T
0
φα
∗
t · dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
|φα∗t |2 dt
}
,
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where φα
∗
t := φ(t,X
α∗
t ,α
∗(t,Xα
∗
t )). By Assumptions 2, the Novikov’s condition is fulfilled. Thus Q ∼ P,
and WQ· := W· +
∫ ·
0
φα
∗
t ds is a standard Brownian motion under Q. In particular, the process Xα
∗
t can
be rewritten as Xα
∗
t = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xα
∗
s ) dW
Q
s , and immediately from (51) we have∫ T
0
EQ|α∗ − αˆ|2(t,Xα∗t ) dt ≤ , (58)
where we denote by EQ the expectation under measure Q. We next compute a bound for Z−γ under Q,
for γ > 1:
EQ[Z−γ ] = EQ
[
exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
φα
∗
t · dWQt −
γ
2
∫ T
0
|φα∗t |2 dt
}]
≤ E1/2Q
[
exp
{
2γ
∫ T
0
φα
∗
t · dWQt − 2γ2
∫ T
0
|φα∗t |2 dt
}]
× E1/2Q
[
exp
{
(2γ2 − γ)
∫ T
0
|φα∗t |2 dt
}]
≤ eCT (γ2− 12γ),
where EpQ denote (EQ[·])p, and we have used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the boundedness of φ in
Assumptions 2. Therefore, we have
E
(∫ T
0
b1(t,Xα
∗
t )− b2(t,Xα
∗
t ) dt
)2
≤ E1−
1
γ
Q
(∫ T
0
b1(t,Xα
∗
t )− b2(t,Xα
∗
t ) dt
) 2γ
γ−1
E 1γQ [Z−γ ]
≤ CγE1−
1
γ
Q
(∫ T
0
b1(t,Xα
∗
t )− b2(t,Xα
∗
t ) dt
)2E1− 1γQ
(∫ T
0
b1(t,Xα
∗
t )− b2(t,Xα
∗
t ) dt
) 2γ+2
γ−1

≤ CγE1−
1
γ
Q
[∫ T
0
|α∗ − αˆ|2(t,Xα∗t ) dt
]
≤ Cγ1− 1γ ,
where we have consecutively used Ho¨lder’s inequality, the estimate of EQ[Z−γ ], the Lipschitz property of
φ(t,x,α), the boundedness of Σ and b, and the estimate (58). Here Cγ is a constant depending on the
constants involved in Assumptions 1–2 in additional to T and γ, which may vary from line to line. With
(57) and noticing 0 < 1− 1γ < 1 we conclude.
In practice, the game is play on T , but not [0, T ]. Therefore, we will define a discrete version of the
stochastic differential game (1)–(2) and evaluate the performance of αpi,m in section 4.2 on the discrete
game. To be precise, given a policy function αpi on T × Rn, we define the discrete state process Xpi,αpitk
and discrete individual cost functional Jpi,i0 (α
pi) as follows
Xpi,α
pi
tk+1
= Xpi,α
pi
tk
+ b(tk,X
pi,αpi
tk
,αpi(tk,X
pi,αpi
tk
))∆tk + Σ(tk,X
pi,αpi
tk
)∆Wk, X
pi,αpi
0 = x0, (59)
Jpi,i0 (α
pi) = E
NT−1∑
j=0
f i(tk,X
pi,αpi
tk
,αpi(tk,X
pi,αpi
tk
))∆tk + g
i(Xpi,α
pi
T )
 .
Note that when there are both pi and α in the superscript of X, it refers to the (discrete) process of
the original state (1), and when there is only pi in the superscript, it refers to the (discrete) process
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs) dWs. We then state a discrete version of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1–3, if αˆpi is a policy function on T × Rn, Lipschitz in x and Ho¨lder
continuous with t:
|αˆpi(t1,x1)− αˆpi(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2],
21
and ∫ T
0
E|α∗(t,Xt)− αˆpi(pi(t),Xpipi(t))|2 dt ≤ , (60)
then
(1) The value of the discrete game produced by αˆpi is close to the one associated to the Nash equilibrium
of the continuous game, i.e.,
|Jpi0 (αˆpi)− J0(α∗)|2 ≤ C[+ ‖pi‖],
where Jpi0 (αˆ
pi) = [Jpi,10 (αˆ
pi), . . . , Jpi,N0 (αˆ
pi)]. Moreover, there exists 0 < i  1 such that
∑N
i=1 
2
i ≤
C[+ ‖pi‖] and
J i0(β
i, αˆpi,−i) ≥ Jpi,i0 (αˆpi)− i, ∀βi ∈ Ai and i ∈ I.
Here C is a constant depending on the coefficients involved in Assumptions 2–3, L′ and T , which may
vary from line to line in the proof.
(2) The generated game paths Xpi,αˆ
pi
tk
are close to the paths Xα
∗
t associated to the Nash equilibrium:
E
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣Xα∗t −Xpi,αˆpipi(t) ∣∣∣)2
]
≤ Cλ[+ ‖pi‖]λ,
where Xα
∗
t follow (1) with the true Nash equilibrium strategy α
∗ and Xpi,αˆ
pi
tk
follow (59). Here λ is an
arbitrary constant in (0, 1), and Cλ is a constant depending on the coefficients involved in Assumptions
2–3, T , L′ and λ.
Proof. Let αˆ(t,x) = inft′∈T [αˆpi(t′,x) + L′|t′ − t| 12 ], then with an argument similar to that in Theorem 3,
αˆ satisfies:
|αˆ(t1,x1)− αˆ(t2,x2)|2 ≤ L′[|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|2]. (61)
By (43), (60) and (61), we have∫ T
0
E|α∗ − αˆ|2(t,Xt) dt
≤ 2
[∫ T
0
E|α∗(t,Xt)− αˆpi(pi(t),Xpipi(t))|2 dt+
∫ T
0
E|αˆ(t,Xt)− αˆpi(pi(t),Xpipi(t))|2 dt
]
≤ C[‖pi‖+ ]. (62)
By the regularity of αˆ (c.f. (61)) and the standard estimates of the Euler Scheme of SDE (c.f. [41]), we
can obtain
E
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣Xαˆt −Xpi,αˆpipi(t) ∣∣∣)2
]
≤ C‖pi‖. (63)
Observing that
Jpi0 (αˆ
pi)− J0(αˆ)
= E
[∫ T
0
[f(pi(t),Xpi,αˆ
pi
pi(t) , αˆ
pi(pi(t),Xpi,αˆ
pi
pi(t) ))− f(t,Xαˆt , αˆ(t,Xαˆt ))] dt+ g(Xpi,αˆ
pi
T )− g(XαˆT )
]
,
with (61), (63) and Assumption 2, one has
|Jpi0 (αˆpi)− J0(αˆ)|2 ≤ C‖pi‖. (64)
Finally, with (62), (63), (64) and Theorem 4, we reach all the conclusions of this theorem.
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5 Numerical Examples
We supplement our theoretical analysis by numerical examples. We shall mainly focus on how deep BSDE
performs when combined with policy update strategy in the decoupling step, i.e., when solving (16). We
refer readers to [27] for the numerical performance when the deep BSDE method is used to solve the sub-
problems derived from fictitious play. The example we present here is an inter-bank game concerning the
systemic risk [13]. Assume an inter-bank market with N banks, and denote by Xit ∈ R the log-monetary
reserves of bank i at time t. Its dynamics are modeled as the following diffusion processes,
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit) + αit] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 dW it
)
, Xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit , i ∈ I.
Here a(Xt −Xit) represents the rate at which bank i borrows from or lends to other banks in the lending
market, while αit denotes its control rate of cash flows to a central bank. The standard Brownian motions
{W it }Ni=0 are independent, in which {W it , i ≥ 1} stands for the idiosyncratic noises and W 0t denotes the
systemic shock, or so-called common noise in the general context. To describe the model in the form of (1),
we concatenate the log-monetary reserves Xit of N banks to form X
α
t = [X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ]
T. The associated
drift term and diffusion term are defined as
b(t,x,α) = [a(x¯− x1) + α1, . . . , a(x¯− xN ) + αN ]T ∈ RN×1, x¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi,
Σ(t,x) =

σρ σ
√
1− ρ2 0 · · · 0
σρ 0 σ
√
1− ρ2 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
σρ 0 0 · · · σ
√
1− ρ2
 ∈ RN×(N+1),
and Wt = (W
0
t , . . . ,W
N
t ) is (N + 1)-dimensional. The cost functional (3) that player i wishes to minimize
has the form
f i(t,x,α) =
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(x¯− xi) + 
2
(x¯− xi)2, gi(x) = c
2
(x¯− xi)2.
Under such specifications, the solution of this game admits a quadratic form whose coefficient functions can
be solved from a Riccati equation. We direct the interested readers to [13, 27] for the detailed interpretation
of this model and the explicit characterization of the solution.
In our numerical computation, we choose N = 10, T = 1, and
a = 0.1, q = 0.1, c = 0.5,  = 0.5, ρ = 0.2, σ = 1.
We discretize the time [0, T ] into NT = 40 intervals and specify the hypothesis spaces N i′0 and {N ik}NT−1k=0
for each player i as follows. We parametrize V i(0,x) (the superscript m is dropped again for simplicity)
with a neural network, denoted by NetV (x), as the space N i′0 of Y i0 . We also parametrize ∇xV i(t,x) with
another network, denoted by Net∇V (t,x), as the space of {N ik}NT−1k=0 , in which the timestamp tk is provided
as another dimension of the input. This choice is in consistence with our theoretical analysis in Theorem 3
involving the linear interpolation of the strategy in time.
In this numerical example, we use fully-connected feedforward networks to instantiate both NetV (x)
and Net∇V (t,x). Since the problem is homogeneous among all the players, we let two networks share the
same parameters among all the players and only solve player 1’s problem for updating the parameters.
Both networks consist of three hidden layers with a width of 40. The activation function is hyperbolic
tangent, and the technique of batch normalization [37] is adopted right after each linear transformation
and before activation. For simplicity, we do not impose the projection procedure discussed in Section 4.2.
Regarding the optimization, the loss function in Deep BSDE is differentiable with respect to the network
parameters. We can use backpropagation to derive the gradient of the loss function with respect to all
the parameters in the neural networks and employ stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to optimize all the
parameters. In this work, we use Adam optimizer [40] to optimize network parameters with constant
learning rate 5e-4 and batch size 256. The parameters are updated by 30000 steps in total.
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Figure 1: A sample path for each player of the inter-bank game when N = 10, obtained from decoupling
the problem by fictitious play and solving the sub-problems with the Deep BSDE method. Top: the
optimal state process Xit (solid lines) and its approximation Xˆ
i
t (circles) provided by the optimized neural
networks, under the same realized path of Brownian motion. Bottom: comparisons of the strategies αit
and αˆit (dashed lines).
To implement the algorithm, we also need to specify the distribution of the initial state x0 in (14) or
(16). We follow the same way as in [27]. Each component of x0, as the initial state of each player, is
sampled independently from the uniform distribution on [−δ0, δ0]. δ0 is chosen such that in the following
process driven by the optimal policy α∗
dXα
∗
t = b(t,X
α∗
t ,α
∗(t,Xα
∗
t )) dt+ Σ(t,X
α∗
t ) dWt, X0 = x0,
the standard deviation of {Xt}Tt=0 is approximately δ0. In other words, δ0 is determined as a fixed-point.
The rationale for such a procedure is to make sure the data generated for the learning is representative
enough in the whole state space.
Note that our technical assumptions are not strictly satisfied in this example, since f , g are not Lipschitz
continuous, φ is not uniform bounded, and T is not sufficiently small. Nevertheless, our numerical results
show that the deep BSDE method can solve this game when combined with policy update. In particular,
we compute the relative error of controls (proportional to the gradient of value function):
RSE =
∑
0≤k≤NT−1
1≤j≤J
(
∇xV 1(tk,x(j)tk )−∇xV̂ 1(tk,x
(j)
tk
)
)2
∑
0≤k≤NT−1
1≤j≤J
(
∇xV 1(tk,x(j)tk )−∇xV
1
)2 ,
where V 1 is the true solution (of player 1), Vˆ 1 is the prediction from the neural networks, and V¯ 1 (resp. ∇xV 1)
is the average of V 1 (resp. ∇xV 1) evaluated at all the indices j, k. To compute the relative error, we gen-
erate J = 256 ground truth sample paths {x(j)tk }NT−1k=0 using Euler scheme based on (16) and the true
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optimal strategy. Note that the superscript (j) here does not mean the player index, but the jth path for
all players. The final RSE for the Deep BSDE method is 0.27%. Figures 1 presents one sample path for
each player of the optimal state process Xit and the optimal control α
i
t vs. their approximations Xˆ
i
t , αˆ
i
t,
with good agreement.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we established the theoretical foundation for the deep fictitious play algorithm for finding
Markovian Nash equilibrium proposed in [27]. Specifically, we proved the following three things: 1. The
solutions of the decoupled sub-problems, if solved exactly and repeatedly, converge to the true Nash equi-
librium; 2. The numerical error of each sub-problem, if solved by deep BSDE individually and repeatedly,
converges to zero subject to the universal approximation capacity of neural networks; 3. The interpolated
strategy based on the deep fictitious play algorithm forms a -Nash equilibrium, after sufficiently many
stages m and with sufficiently small mesh ‖pi‖. We also generalize the algorithm by proposing a new
approach to decouple the games, and present a numerical example in the end to show the empirical conver-
gence beyond the technical assumptions used in the theorems. In the future, with this solidly established
theory of deep fictitious play, we aim to study the competitions in Finance, including P2P lending platforms
from the Fintech industry and insurance markets. We also plan to generalize the theory and algorithm to
stochastic differential games with delays.
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